D&CP – BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION

Resource Summary

($ in thousands)

Appropriations	FY 2008 Actual	FY 2009 Estimate	FY 2010 Request	Increase / Decrease
Positions	263	263	264	1
Funds	44,596	45,999	49,922	3,923

Mission

The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) is responsible for managing a broad range of U.S. policies, programs, agreements, and initiatives in the areas of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and arms control. ISN leads the Department's efforts to prevent the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) – whether nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological – and their delivery systems, and the acquisition or development of such weapons capabilities by terrorists. ISN works with other Department bureaus, other Executive Branch agencies, and foreign partners to prevent, protect against, and respond to the threat or use of WMD by terrorists. The Bureau also works to control transfers of advanced conventional weapons and dual-use goods and technologies. Through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, the Bureau spearheads efforts to promote international consensus on the threats posed by WMD proliferation and on ways to address such threats, and works to shore up the credibility of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. The Bureau addresses WMD proliferation threats posed by non-state actors and terrorist groups by promoting interdiction and sanctions. The Bureau works closely with the UN Security Council, NATO allies, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and other international institutions and organizations to reduce and eliminate the threats posed by WMD. It manages U.S. participation, and promotes coordination, in the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

Priorities

The proliferation of WMD, their means of delivery, and related materials, technologies, and expertise is a preeminent challenge to American national security. Combating this threat is one of the highest priorities of the Department of State, and is led by the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN).

WMD Nonproliferation

The Bureau's highest priority is to deal with the proliferation challenges posed by Iran, North Korea, and WMD terrorism. ISN is deeply involved in the Department's efforts to maintain united international pressure on Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water-related activities and address the serious concerns that have been raised about Iran's past efforts to develop a nuclear warhead. The Bureau also contributes to the Department's efforts to assist North Korea in implementing its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards at an early date, by participating in the Six-Party Process, funding and monitoring North Korean dismantlement actions, and coordinating with the IAEA and others. The Bureau has given increased attention to the threat of WMD terrorism. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism is maturing rapidly to develop partners' and international capacity for deterring and responding to a WMD terrorism event. The Bureau also has responsibility for the diplomatic aspects of the U.S. missile defense program, working with allies and friends to cooperate with the U.S. program.

Iran has concealed from the international community sensitive fuel cycle activities that are a significant step toward a nuclear weapons capability, has pursued development of a nuclear warhead, and continues to develop ballistic missile capabilities. Iran has refused to provide the IAEA sufficient access and cooperation to provide assurances of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons while a party to the NPT would pose a direct challenge to the international nonproliferation regime. Armed with nuclear weapons, Iran would be a threat to the region and to U.S. interests in the Middle East. This indicator records U.S. and

international progress in managing this challenge to the NPT and to regional and international security. It is important to maintain international pressure on Iran.

STRATEGIC GOAL: ACHIEVING PEACE AND SECURITY	
Strategic Priority: Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Destabilizing Conventional Weapons	
Indicator: Status of Iran's Nuclear Program	
Target FY 2010	Iran's suspension of all uranium enrichment-related, reprocessing, and heavy water-related activities (also termed 'proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities') continues and negotiations continue or conclude on a long-term political settlement. International Atomic Energy Agency inspections and investigations continue into any remaining outstanding issues. Iran ceases using the international financial system to support proliferation and terrorism activities and is denied the ability to engage in clandestine sensitive procurement efforts.
Target FY 2009	*(Since FY08 Targets were not met, they are repeated for FY09).* Iran re-suspends all proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, verified by the IAEA, and negotiations continue until agreement on a long-term political settlement. IAEA inspections and investigations continue into any remaining outstanding issues with the aim of demonstrating that Iran's nuclear program declarations are correct and complete. A coalition of states is maintained to press Iran to comply with its international obligations and to implement measures against Iran's use of the international financial system to support proliferation and terrorism activities.
Target FY 2008	Iran re-suspends all proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, verified by the IAEA, and negotiations continue until agreement on a long-term political settlement. IAEA inspections and investigations continue into any remaining outstanding issues with the aim of demonstrating that Iran's nuclear program declarations are correct and complete. A coalition of states is maintained to press Iran to comply with its International obligations and to implement measures against Iran's use of the international financial system to support proliferation and terrorism activities.
Results FY 2008	**Rating: Improved over prior year, but not met** In FY 2008, the IAEA released 4 reports, the latest in September 2008, noting that Iran had not halted its uranium enrichment- and heavy water-related activities. IAEA reports also indicated that Iran is not providing a full accounting to the IAEA of detailed documentation describing Iran's efforts to develop a nuclear warhead. In March 2008, the UNSC adopted new sanctions through UNSCR 1803 by a vote of 14-0, with Indonesia abstaining, and in September, unanimously adopted UNSCR 1835. The U.S. government used Executive Order 13382 to designate major portions of the Iranian economy and leadership apparatus, including the Ministry of Armed Forces and Logistics, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, Bank Melli, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to increase the pressure on Iran to cooperate with the international community.
Impact	An Iran with a nuclear weapons capability would be a serious threat to regional and international security and a direct challenge to the NPT regime. Iran concealed from the IAEA sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities that are a step toward achieving a large-scale enrichment capability. Iran must be persuaded to cease its uranium enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water-related activities.
Steps to Improve	The U.S. will continue to ensure that international pressure on Iran remains strong. The U.S. will seek increasingly severe sanctions on Iran aimed at isolating it politically and economically while still making available to Iran the package of incentives conveyed to Iran in June 2006 and again in June 2008.
Results FY 2007	Iran continues to refuse to re-suspend its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities enrichment-related activity or to cooperate fully with the IAEA. ISN has pursued a diplomatic track through unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral sanctions in coordination with the Treasury Department. In addition to UN Security Council Resolution 1696, two more resolutions have been unanimously adopted (UNSCRs 1737 and 1747) and Chapter VII sanctions were imposed on Iran in an effort to achieve the desired impact of Iran suspending its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, cooperating fully with the IAEA, and engaging in negotiations on the future of its nuclear program. A third Chapter VII sanctions resolution was adopted in March 2008 when Iran continued to fail to comply with its UN Security Council and IAEA obligations. (In March 2008)

Results FY 2006	Iran restarted its uranium enrichment activities in January 2006. The IAEA reported Iran's noncompliance to the UN Security Council in February, 2006 and the Security Council unanimously adopted a Presidential Statement calling on Iran to fully suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. The U.S., China, France, Germany, Russia, and the UK offered a package of incentives in return for full compliance. In July, 2006, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1696, giving Iran until August 31, 2006, to comply. Iran refused. In December 2006, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1737, imposing Chapter VII sanctions on Iran, which include prohibitions on Iran's procurement of technology that could contribute to proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, and provision of financial support.
Results FY 2005	The target was to maintain international consensus that Iran should not possess enrichment or reprocessing facilities and prevent outside assistance to Iran's nuclear program. In August 2005, Iran resumed uranium conversion activities at its Esfahan facility. In response to this and other Iranian violations of its IAEA safeguards agreement, the IAEA formally found Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations in September, 2005. International consensus was maintained and international pressure increased.
VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION	
Data Source and Quality	Embassy reporting, bilateral consultations, IAEA and UNSC reporting. Data Quality Assessment revealed no significant data limitations.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

Another high priority is to strengthen the global nuclear proliferation regime by shoring up the credibility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and by promoting ways for states to benefit from civil nuclear energy while avoiding associated proliferation risks. The Bureau manages the NPT Review process and is working to ensure that NPT States Parties address issues of compliance with NPT obligations. The Bureau leads negotiations with selected countries on peaceful nuclear cooperation, and manages diplomatic aspects of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership and many other initiatives to ensure that states would have access to fuel for nuclear power plants. The Bureau also leads efforts to reduce the amount of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium and plutonium in the world, and to make nuclear reactors and storage sites for weapons-grade nuclear materials more proliferation resistant. ISN manages permanent U.S. delegations to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, where the U.S. is promoting negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, as well as to the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty in Vienna and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague.

In the face of the challenges posed by Iran and North Korea, the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, with the NPT at its center, needs to remain relevant and effective. The U.S. seeks to strengthen the IAEA's ability to carry out its information-driven safeguards regime, especially in regard to IAEA probes of Iran, Syria, and North Korea. The IAEA also contributes to efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism and ensure that the international expansion of nuclear power occurs within a rigorous system of safeguards, security, and safety. This indicator tracks progress in meeting these objectives, by keeping track of the number of states with effective safeguards (additional protocol), and NPT parties' commitment to the Treaty and enforcing compliance through the Review Process.

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STRATEGIC GOAL: ACHIEVING PEACE AND SECURITY	
Strategic Priority: Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Destabilizing Conventional Weapons	
Indicator: Status of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Regime and Strengthening of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards	
Target FY 2010	NPT parties conduct Review Conference that includes substantive debate on Treaty issues of importance to the USG and helps to strengthen NPT as a barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons. Review Conference reaches common ground on many of these issues, though the highly contentious nature of the issues at time of writing means this target cannot include adoption of consensus documents. NPT Parties act to ensure compliance with NPT obligations and promote strengthened safeguards and nuclear safety and security. IAEA member states begin to engage constructively on proposals for future direction of IAEA, e.g., the Vision 2020 Initiative. U.S. implements U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol. Additional states sign, have Board of Governors approval of, and/or bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols.
Target FY 2009	Third session of the Preparatory Committee completes all necessary preparatory work for the 2010 Review Conference, unless NPT Parties agree to a fourth Preparatory Committee to complete preparations; NPT Parties engage in substantive discussions on key nonproliferation issues. NPT Parties act to ensure compliance with NPT obligations and promote strengthened safeguards and nuclear safety and security. Support grows for U.S. plan for strengthening safeguards. IAEA member states endorse a response to the IAEA Vision 2020 Initiative in a manner that strengthens the international safeguards regime. U.S. prepares to bring U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol into force by the time of the NPT Review Conference. Additional states sign, have Board of Governors approval of, and/or bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols.
Target FY 2008	Second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Committee completes all necessary work for convening the third session. NPT Parties engage in substantive discussion on key nonproliferation issues. NPT Parties act to ensure compliance with nonproliferation obligations and promote strengthened safeguards and nuclear safety and security. With lapse of mandate for the Committee on Safeguards and Verification, USG seeks support from like-minded states on the development of recommendations for strengthening safeguards.
Results FY 2008	**Rating: On Target** The 2008 Preparatory Committee completed its work successfully and engaged in substantive debate. USG acquired support for 2 U.S.-drafted papers that start a process of developing consensus language on Treaty issues. ISN undertook extensive efforts to return Iran and North Korea to compliance with the NPT. ISN worked with other states to strengthen IAEA safeguards and nuclear security/safety programs through its leadership in the Board of Governors and financial and policy support to the IAEA. ISN regularly urges other states to conclude safeguards agreements and support the IAEA politically and financially. ISN is pursuing recommendations for strengthened safeguards through bilateral consultations and the Department of Energy's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative. 88 states now have Additional Protocols in force.
Impact	The NPT is the bedrock of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation strategy, providing the legal underpinning for the system of rules that define the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. It seeks to ensure that nuclear energy is used for peaceful purposes, requiring that nuclear activities be subject to IAEA safeguards.
Results FY 2007	Iran used procedural disputes to constrain time for debate of substantive issues at the 2007 PrepCom (e.g., objecting to a phrase about "reaffirming the need for full compliance with the Nonproliferation Treaty"). Other delegations held firm against these ploys in a display of international unity for the integrity of the Treaty review process that included most members of the Non-Aligned Movement. The PrepCom completed necessary work for the 2008 PrepCom, and discussed issues (e.g., how to deter withdrawal from the Treaty by violators). The Safeguards Committee lapsed, but USG will pursue the Secretariat's 18 recommendations for strengthening safeguards in other IAEA fora. One state signed an Additional Protocol; five others brought Protocols into force. Eighty-five states now have Additional Protocols in force.

Results FY 2006	The Nonproliferation Treaty Parties responded strongly to Iran's non-compliance. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1696 requiring Iranian action under Chapter VII in response. The G-8 Summit endorsed nuclear fuel cycle approaches to reduce incentives for developing enrichment and reprocessing. Three additional states signed Additional Protocols and six more brought Protocols into force, bringing the total to 77 countries. The Nuclear Suppliers Group failed to require an Additional Protocol as a condition of supply. The International Atomic Energy Agency approved safeguards funding increases. The Special Committee began work, but failed to make recommendations. Fourteen IAEA missions helped strengthen control and security for nuclear and other radioactive material.
Results FY 2005	The 2005 Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference demonstrated continued support for the Treaty and focused on North Korea and Iran Treaty violations and on measures to strengthen compliance. However, procedural disputes sharply limited time available for negotiation on an outcome document. Fifteen more Additional Protocols approved, for a total of 112, with 69 in force. The IAEA approved an Additional Protocol for Malaysia, which represented an important step toward broader acceptance of the Additional Protocol by the Non-Aligned Group. A Committee on Safeguards and Verification was approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors and is a U.S. Presidential initiative designed to further strengthen safeguards and bolster the International Atomic Energy Agency role in enforcement.
VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION	
Data Source and Quality	Performance data is from UN, NPT, and IAEA documents, reports of UN and IAEA meetings, U.S. and other governments' statements and papers, embassy reporting, consultations with the IAEA, UN, and foreign government officials. Data Quality Assessment revealed no significant data limitations.

Counterproliferation

The use of new tools for counterproliferation is also of high priority. The tools will proactively help to interdict WMD shipments, close off sources of proliferation funding, apply sanctions, and help states to improve their border security, export controls, and national legislation criminalizing proliferation activities. The Bureau spearheaded the Department's effort to get the UN Security Council to adopt Resolution 1540 in 2004, a legally-binding requirement for states to prevent proliferation, and succeeded in having the mandate for its implementing committee renewed until 2011. The Bureau has diplomatic responsibility for the Proliferation Security Initiative, a commitment by over 90 states to take action to interdict shipments, disrupt proliferation networks, and shut down the front companies that support them. The Bureau co-chairs with Treasury a Committee that implements Executive Order 13382, which authorizes the USG to freeze assets and block transactions of designated entities and persons engaged in proliferation activities. The Bureau engages in intensive diplomatic activity to encourage other states to join the U.S. in disrupting WMD proliferation networks and detecting and responding to cases of nuclear smuggling.

Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation

Dealing with chemical and biological weapons proliferation is another high priority. The Bureau manages diplomatic work relating to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, actively engaging with other States Parties to improve and strengthen national implementation of their Treaty obligations. The Bureau also works with countries and international organizations and groups to develop effective pathogen security legislation, strengthen the security of laboratories around the world dealing with dangerous pathogens, and engage biological and chemical scientists, technicians, and engineers with dual-use expertise.

Missile Technology and Control Regime

The Bureau also leads U.S. participation in the Missile Technology and Control Regime (MTCR) to strengthen the political will and capacity of member states to control missile-related exports and thereby limit the ability of proliferators and rogue states to acquire the technologies to develop WMD-capable missile delivery systems. The MTCR also has facilitated international cooperation to halt numerous shipments of proliferation concern, thereby making it more costly, time consuming, and difficult for programs of concern in Iran and North Korea to advance.

Advanced Conventional Weapons

Although the bulk of the ISN Bureau's work is devoted to WMD issues, considerable resources are also committed to stemming the proliferation of advanced conventional weapons, particularly through such multilateral efforts as the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. The Bureau also leads U.S. participation in international discussions to improve regulation of international trade in

conventional arms; a top priority is to control trade in Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) which, in the hands of terrorists, pose a serious threat to U.S. and international commercial and military aircraft. The Bureau also leads implementation of U.S. policy concerning U.S. and foreign commercial remote sensing satellite matters, and negotiates government-to-government agreements concerning transfers of remote sensing satellites and technology to foreign governments and entities.

Justification of Program Change

International Security and Non-Proliferation
The request includes $3.2 million and funding for one additional domestic position. ISN is the Department's, and often the U.S. Government's, lead for recommending and implementing WMD nonproliferation policies. The FY 2010 request for "International Security and Nonproliferation" will enable the ISN Bureau to meet treaty obligations and fulfill its diplomatic mission. The bulk of the Bureau's request is to cover the estimated U.S. contribution for its share of the assessment costs associated with the 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, which is payable to the United Nations. The NPT is the bedrock of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation strategy, providing legal underpinning for the system of rules and laws that define the nuclear nonproliferation regime. U.S. diplomatic efforts with regard to Iran are based, in large part, on its non-compliance with NPT obligations. As the leader in global nuclear nonproliferation efforts, and as the largest contributor to NPT meetings, the United States must set an example and, among other things, pay its NPT contributions in full and on time.

Diplomacy is, of course, ISN's primary tool for achieving U.S. WMD nonproliferation objectives, and experience has demonstrated that face-to-face contacts have the greatest impact in gaining support for U.S. initiatives and policies. The Bureau's work ranges from engagement in high-profile diplomatic efforts such as Iran and North Korea, to the management of implementation of major world-wide Presidential initiatives such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative, to labor-intensive work in bolstering the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy in ways that are safe and proliferation-resistant, and ensuring effective implementing of many existing nonproliferation and arms control agreements. People -- and their ability to travel -- are keys to the Bureau's success.

The primary component of the FY 2010 request for "International Security and Nonproliferation" is to pay the estimated U.S. contributions for the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The immediate outcome achieved by this payment is the reinforcement of U.S. diplomatic policies as the United States calls on states, such as Iran, to comply with NPT obligations. To be the leader in international efforts to combat nuclear proliferation, the U.S. must always set an example. Paying the NPT contributions in full and on time helps maintain U.S. credibility. The longer-term outcomes are that U.S. policies are respected and the NPT and the global nuclear nonproliferation regime are strengthened. One way the ISN Bureau measures that longer-term outcome is by recording the advance in the number of states adhering to the 1997 upgraded nuclear safeguards agreement ("Additional Protocol") administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which strengthens significantly the Agency's ability to verify that safeguarded nuclear material and activities are not used for military purposes. The Additional Protocol is an essential barrier against the spread of nuclear weapons and the U.S. invests significant resources to ensure that the program of nuclear safeguards is effective and that all states adhere to the Additional Protocol. Eighty-five states now have Additional Protocols in force; the target for FY 2010 is to have 98 in force.

D&CP – BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION

FY 2010 Request
Resource Summary

	Positions				Funds ($ in thousands)		
	American			Pos	Bureau	American	Funds
	Domestic	Overseas	FSN	Total	Managed	Salaries	Total
FY 2008 Actual	250	13	0	263	17,159	27,437	44,596
FY 2009 Estimate	250	13	0	263	17,376	28,623	45,999
FY 2010 Built-in Changes							
Annualization of FY 2009 American COLA	0	0	0	0	55	142	197
Domestic Inflation	0	0	0	0	38	0	38
FY 2010 American Cost of Living Adjustment	0	0	0	0	146	437	583
Total Built-in Changes	0	0	0	0	239	579	818
FY 2010 Current Services	250	13	0	263	17,615	29,202	46,817
FY 2010 Program Changes							
International Security and Non-proliferation	1	0	0	1	2,994	111	3,105
Total Program Changes	1	0	0	1	2,994	111	3,105
FY 2010 Request	251	13	0	264	20,609	29,313	49,922

Staff by Program Activity
(positions)

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation	FY 2008 Actual	FY 2009 Estimate	FY 2010 Request	Increase / Decrease
Conduct of Diplomatic Relations	259	259	260	1
Domestic Administrative Management	6	6	6	0
Domestic Financial Services	10	10	11	1
Domestic General Services	10	10	10	0
Domestic Personnel Services	15	15	15	0
International Security Affairs	13	207	13	(194)
Mission Direction	11	11	11	0
Public Diplomacy	4	4	4	0
Total	**263**	**263**	**264**	**1**

D&CP – BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION

Funds by Program Activity

($ in thousands)

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation	FY 2008 Actual	FY 2009 Estimate	FY 2010 Request	Increase / Decrease
Conduct of Diplomatic Relations	43,966	45,350	49,254	3,904
Domestic Administrative Management	1,010	1,042	1,060	18
Domestic Financial Services	1,407	1,457	1,614	157
Domestic General Services	1,417	1,467	1,494	27
Domestic Personnel Services	2,066	2,140	2,179	39
International Security Affairs	35,730	0	0	0
Mission Direction	2,336	2,401	2,461	60
Public Diplomacy	630	649	668	19
Public Diplomacy - Program Costs	630	0	0	0
Total	**44,596**	**45,999**	**49,922**	**3,923**

FY 2010 Request
Program Activities

	Positions				Funds ($ in thousands)		
	American			Pos	Bureau	American	Funds
Department Of State	Domestic	Overseas	FSN	Total	Managed	Salaries	Total
Conduct of Diplomatic Relations	**247**	**13**	**0**	**260**	**20,601**	**28,653**	**49,254**
Domestic Administrative Management	6	0	0	6	399	661	1,060
Domestic Financial Services	11	0	0	11	402	1,212	1,614
Domestic General Services	10	0	0	10	392	1,102	1,494
Domestic Personnel Services	15	0	0	15	526	1,653	2,179
International Security Affairs	0	13	0	13	0	0	0
Mission Direction	11	0	0	11	1,249	1,212	2,461
Public Diplomacy	**4**	**0**	**0**	**4**	**8**	**660**	**668**
Total	**251**	**13**	**0**	**264**	**20,609**	**29,313**	**49,922**

D&CP – BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION

Staff by Domestic Organization Unit

(positions)

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation	FY 2008 Actual	FY 2009 Estimate	FY 2010 Request	Increase / Decrease
Budget and General Services	10	10	10	0
Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction	13	13	13	0
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Commission	2	0	0	0
Conference on Disarmament and Special Rep for Nuclear Nonproliferation	6	0	0	0
Conventional Arms Threat Reduction	14	14	14	0
Cooperative Threat Reduction	11	11	11	0
Counterproliferation Initiatives	19	19	19	0
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy and Negotiations	2	2	2	0
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Threat Reduction, Export Controls and Negotiation	2	2	2	0
Export Controls	0	15	15	0
Export Controls Cooperation	15	0	0	0
Human Resource Division	15	15	15	0
Missile Threat Reduction	8	8	8	0
Multinational Nuclear Affairs	0	13	13	0
Multinational Nuclear and Security Affairs	13	0	0	0
Nonproliferation Disarmament Fund	14	14	14	0
Nuclear Energy, Safety and Security	21	21	21	0
Office of Assistant Secretary	11	11	11	0
Office of Missile Defense and Space Policy	10	10	10	0
Office of the Executive Director	6	6	6	0
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	5	0	0	0
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counterproliferation	2	2	2	0
Regional Affairs	19	19	19	0
Resource Management Division	10	10	11	1
Senior Advisor to the International Atomic Energy Agency	1	1	1	0
Strategic Planning and Outreach	13	13	13	0
WMD/Terrorism	21	21	21	0
Total	**263**	**250**	**251**	**1**

D&CP – BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION

Funds by Domestic Organization Unit

($ in thousands)

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation	FY 2008 Actual	FY 2009 Estimate	FY 2010 Request	Increase / Decrease
Budget and General Services	1,417	1,467	1,494	27
Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction	2,160	2,229	2,269	40
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Commission	1,030	0	0	0
Conference on Disarmament and Special Rep for Nuclear Nonproliferation	3,282	0	0	0
Conventional Arms Threat Reduction	2,368	2,442	2,487	45
Cooperative Threat Reduction	1,716	1,773	1,804	31
Counterproliferation Initiatives	2,541	2,633	2,796	163
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy and Negotiations	352	363	368	5
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Threat Reduction, Export Controls and Negotiation	314	324	329	5
Export Controls	0	2,137	2,176	39
Export Controls Cooperation	2,063	0	0	0
Human Resource Division	2,066	2,140	2,179	39
Missile Threat Reduction	1,190	1,231	1,254	23
Multinational Nuclear Affairs	0	2,664	5,123	2,459
Multinational Nuclear and Security Affairs	2,589	0	0	0
Nonproliferation Disarmament Fund	1,622	1,687	1,720	33
Nuclear Energy, Safety and Security	3,266	3,374	3,545	171
Office of Assistant Secretary	2,336	2,401	2,461	60
Office of Missile Defense and Space Policy	1,449	1,499	1,527	28
Office of the Executive Director	1,010	1,042	1,060	18
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	1,930	0	0	0
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counterproliferation	324	334	339	5
Regional Affairs	2,692	2,786	2,839	53
Resource Management Division	1,407	1,457	1,614	157
Senior Advisor to the International Atomic Energy Agency	196	202	204	2
Strategic Planning and Outreach	2,192	2,260	2,510	250
WMD/Terrorism	3,084	3,190	3,361	171
Total	**44,596**	**39,635**	**43,459**	**3,824**

D&CP – BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION

Staff by Post

(positions)

International Security and Nonproliferation	FY 2008 Actual			FY 2009 Estimate			FY 2010 Request			Increase/ Decrease		
	Amer	FSN	Total	Amer	FSN	Total	Amer	FSN	Total	Amer	FSN	Total
Commissioner to Conf on Disarmament & Special Rep for Nuclear Nonproliferation	0	0	0	6	0	6	6	0	6	0	0	0
Commissioner to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Vienna)	0	0	0	2	0	2	2	0	2	0	0	0
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	0	0	0	5	0	5	5	0	5	0	0	0
Total	**0**	**0**	**0**	**13**	**0**	**13**	**13**	**0**	**13**	**0**	**0**	**0**

Funds by Post

($ in thousands)

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation	FY 2008 Actual	FY 2009 Estimate	FY 2010 Request	Increase / Decrease
Commissioner to Conf on Disarmament & Special Rep for Nuclear Nonproliferation	0	3,344	3,397	53
Commissioner to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Vienna)	0	1,049	1,065	16
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	0	1,971	2,001	30
Total	**0**	**6,364**	**6,463**	**99**

Funds by Object Class

($ in thousands)

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation	FY 2008 Actual	FY 2009 Estimate	FY 2010 Request	Increase / Decrease
1100 Personnel Compensation	24,380	25,641	26,047	406
1200 Personnel Benefits	5,562	5,596	5,943	347
2100 Travel & Trans of Persons	2,795	2,736	3,298	562
2300 Rents, Comm & Utilities	858	840	874	34
2400 Printing & Reproduction	266	260	271	11
2500 Other Services	10,169	10,372	12,912	2,540
2600 Supplies and Materials	148	145	151	6
3100 Personal Property	4	4	4	0
4100 Grants, Subsidies & Contrb	414	405	422	17
Total	**44,596**	**45,999**	**49,922**	**3,923**